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Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential
Impact of Young v. American
Mini Theaters
By JANE M. FRiEDMAN*
It is perhaps inappropriate that this article appears in a symposium
covering recent developments in obscenity law. This article is not de-
voted to a discussion of obscenity law as it is generally defined, but
rather to the emergence of a new legal phenomenon: "adult" law.
This offshoot of traditional obscenity law came into being in 1976 when
the Supreme Court held that "adult" motion pictures, even though not
necessarily obscene, are a new genre of erotica which can be subjected
to local regulation. In that decision, Young v. American Mini
Theaters, Inc.,1 the Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance which pro-
vides that an adult motion picture theater may not, absent a waiver of
the restriction by the Zoning Commission, be located within one
thousand feet of any two other "regulated uses."' The ordinance de-
fines an "adult motion picture theater" as:
An enclosed building... used for ... presenting material distin-
guished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, de-
scribing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified
* A.B., 1962, J.D., 1965, University of Minnesota, Professor of Law, Wayne
State University.
1. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
2. The ordinance provides: "In addition to adult motion picture theaters and
'Mini' theaters, which contain less than 50 seats, the regulated uses include Adult Book
Stores; Group "D" Cabaret; Establishment for the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor for
consumption on the premises; Hotels or motels; pawnships; Pool or billiard halls; Public
lodging houses; Secondhand stores; Shoeshine parlors; and Taxi dance halls." Id. at
52 n.3.
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Anatomical Areas' [both terms being explicitly defined in the ordi-
nance3] for observation by patrons therein.
4
Violation of the restrictive provision is punishable by a fine or jail sen-
tence.5
The challenge to the ordinance was brought by two theater oper-
ators, both of whom "propose[d] to offer adult fare on a regular
basis."6  While not attacking the specificity of the definition of "spe-
cified anatomical areas" or "specified sexual activities," plaintiffs
argued, inter alia, that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in
that it set forth no standards for determining how much of the de-
scribed activity had to be depicted before a movie would be character-
ized by an emphasis on such matter. In addition, they claimed that
the waiver provisions were both procedurally inadequate and substan-
tially defective. The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan sustained the validity of the ordinance,7 but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,8 holding that
the ordinance was an unconstitutional prior restraint and a denial of
equal protection. Following a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court
held that the ordinance was neither an invalid prior restraint nor a
denial of equal protection. Moreover, the Court found that the pro-
vision was not unconstitutionally vague, as applied to the respondents,
because they both had admitted that they proposed to exhibit only
sexually explicit "adult" fare at their theaters. For this same reason,
the respondents were deemed to lack standing to challenge the alleged
procedural and substantive defects within the waiver provision.
The Court seemed to concede that there might be theater oper-
ators who do not offer "adult fare" on a regular basis and who might
3. The Detroit ordinance defines "specified sexual activities" as:
"1. Human Genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
"2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
"3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock or
female breast."
"Specified anatomical areas" are defined as:
"1. Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic region,
(b) buttock, and (c) female breast below a point immediately above the top of the
areola; and
"2. Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and
opaquely covered." Id. at 53 n.4.
4. Id. at 53-54 n.5.
5. See id. at 90 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Official Zoning Ordinance of
Detroit § 69,000).
6. Id. at 59.
7. See Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
8. See American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975).
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genuinely be in doubt as to the amount of sexually explicit activity that
can be depicted before a motion picture can be said to be "character-
ized by an emphasis" on such matter. However, Justice Stevens con-
cluded for the majority that should these hypothetical litigants ever
appear before the state courts, those courts can readily subject the ordi-
nance to a saving construction. He noted:
Since there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibi-
tion of material that is on the border line between pornography
and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of
social and political significance, and since the limited amount of
uncertainty in the statute is easily susceptible of a narrowing con-
struction, we think this is an inappropriate case in which to adju-
dicate the hypothetical claims of persons not before the Court.9
Justice Powell concurred with the opinion of the Court on the
ground that the zoning ordinance "present[ed] an example of innova-
tive land-use regulation, implicating First Amendment concerns only
incidentally and to a limited extent."1 Justices Stewart and Blackmun
each wrote dissenting opinions, joined by each other and by Justices
Brennan and Marshall.
It is the thesis of this article that far from "presenting an example
of innovative land-use regulation, implicating First Amendment con-
cerns only incidentally and to a limited extent,"1" the American Mini
Theaters decision is bound to create a censorial nightmare for the
entire motion picture industry and, consequently, for the movie-going
public. Moreover, that decision will, in all likelihood, impose substan-
tial burdens on the state and local judiciaries which will be compelled
to become involved in a new, and additional, genre of litigation over
erotic movies. Now the courts will be called upon to decide not only
which movies are "obscene" under state and local obscenity laws, but
also, on a case-by-case basis, which movies are "adult" within the
meaning of a burgeoning number of local zoning ordinances.'
2
9. 427 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
11. Id.
12. Five months after the American Mini Theatres decision was rendered, the
New York Times reported that zoning ordinances similar to the one in Detroit had al-
ready been enacted in Indianapolis, Indiana and Fairfax County, Virginia. "And many
others, including Los Angeles, Des Moines, Iowa, Portland, Ore. and Kansas City, Mo.
are now considering passage of such laws." Lindsey, Drive by Cities on Pornography
Spurred by Detroit Zoning Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
Clearly, since the Detroit zoning ordinance purports to restrict only the location
of adult theaters without attempting to eliminate them altogether, the problem of censor-
ship inherent therein will not arise for those theater owners whose facilities are not
located within one thousand feet of another regulated use. However, because regu-
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While none of the justices appeared to appreciate fully the poten-
tial burden that their decision would place on the state and local courts,
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, clearly foresaw the first tier of the
problem: the plight of the general release exhibitor who occasionally
wishes to show a sexually explicit film, perhaps one with a high degree
of social value. In this regard, he said:
We should put ourselves for a moment in the shoes of the
motion picture exhibitor. Let us suppose that, having previously
offered only a more innocuous fare, he decides to vary it by ex-
hibiting on certain days films from a series which occasionally deals
explicitly with sex. The exhibitor must determine whether this
places his theatre into the "adult" class prescribed [sic] by the
challenged ordinance. If the theatre is within that class, it must be
licensed, and it may be entirely prohibited, depending on its loca-
tion.
* * . It will be simple enough, as the operator screens films,
to tell when one of these [specified anatomical] areas or [specified
sexual] activities is being depicted, but if the depiction represents
only a part of the films' subject matter, I am at loss to know how
he will tell whether they are "distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis" on those areas and activities. The ordinance gives him
no guidance. Neither does it instruct him on how to tell whether,
assuming the films in question are thus "distinguished or charac-
terized," his theatre is being "used for . . . presenting" such films.
That phrase could mean ever used, often used, or predominantly
used, to name a few possibilities.
13
The quandary envisioned by Justice Blackmun was not a hypothetical
one. A few months after the Court rendered its opinion in American
Mini Theaters, the King County Council in the state of Washington
passed a zoning ordinance banning the showing of "adult" films in un-
incorporated areas of the county that were in close proximity to residen-
tial neighborhoods. "Adult" films were defined in the ordinance as
those which were "characterized by their emphasis on matter explicitly
depicting specified sexual activities." An attorney representing several
theater owners in the county, none of whom exhibited sexually explicit
movies on a regular basis, complained to the council that he was not
certain which motion pictures were "adult" within the meaning of the
zoning ordinance. A county councilman responded by informing the
lated uses in the ordinance include such businesses as adult book stores, cabarets, bars,
hotels, motels, pawnshops and similar uses, the probability that a theater will be located
too close to such an establishment is high. The ordinance may thus apply to the major-
ity of theater owners, at one time or another. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 89-90 (1976).
13. 427 U.S. at 88-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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attorney that his clients could "stay out of trouble by simply not showing
filthy movies.'
14
Certainly, most King County theater operators and others similarly
situated throughout the country, will want to "stay out of trouble," par-
ticularly since violation of such a restrictive ordinance might result in
the imposition of a jail sentence.15 But by what standards should an
exhibitor gauge his conduct? Prior to American Mini Theaters, the
exhibitor and his attorney needed to determine only if a movie was "ob-
scene" under the tripartite test set forth by the Supreme Court in Miller
v. California.' There, the Court declared:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law, and (c) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
17
While this test of obscenity is believed by many to be unduly vague
and subjective, it appears to be a model of clarity and precision when
compared to the Detroit and King County definitions of "adult." In
addition to its concern with patent offensiveness and lack of social
value, the Miller test does focus on the prurient appeal of the ma-
terial taken as a whole. Thus, a theater owner who exhibits general
release movies, some of which include occasional or isolated sexually
explicit scenes, can be relatively secure in the belief that showing such
films will not subject him to an obscenity. conviction. Moreover, if he
is convicted for showing such a movie, it is likely that ultimately he will
be vindicated on appeal.' 8
The Detroit definition of "adult," however, can instill no such
sense of security. It is not at all clear that a motion picture with "spe-
cified sexual" scenes which are merely occasional or transitory will be
excluded from the purview of an "adult" zoning statute. How, then,
will the exhibitor's plight be resolved?
The possibilities, it seems, are four-fold. First, if no legislative
or judicial clarification is forthcoming, the exhibitor can resort to self-
censorship. Second, the exhibitor can apply for a waiver of the zoning
restriction. Third, he might risk showing the questionable film and
14. Variety, Dec. 1, 1976, at 39, col. 2.
15. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
16. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. Id. at 24.
18. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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then, upon prosecution or other official action, ask the state courts to
subject the ordinance to a narrowing construction. Finally, a city
council, when enacting such an ordinance, might attempt to define
statutorily how much of a film must be "distinguished or characterized
by an emphasis" on specified anatomical areas or sexual activities in
order to be classified as "adult."
The remainder of this article will be devoted to a brief discussion
of each of these four alternatives.
Self-Censorship
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, whenever a gen-
eral release exhibitor wishes to show a movie with some erotic con-
tent, that exhibitor must ascertain not only whether he is about to
slide into the "regulated use" category, but also whether, at that time,
the definition of "regulated use" is applicable to any of his neighbors.
At any moment he could become a violator of the ordinance be-
cause some neighbor has slipped into a "regulated use" classifi-
cation. . . . Lest he let down his guard, he should remember that
if he miscalculates on any of these issues, he may pay a fine or
go to jail.
It would not be surprising if, under the circumstances, the
exhibitor chose to forgo showing the film series altogether.19
Assuming that many exhibitors will decide to simply forgo the
showing of all films which might be classified as "adult," it is likely
that some of them will not bother to prescreen each film and attempt
to make individual decisions as to their "adult" nature. There already
exists in the motion picture industry a program of self-regulation which
classifies most motion pictures as "adult," "almost adult," or "nonadult"
prior to their release to the exhibitor. Under the Motion Picture
Rating System, the vast majority of motion pictures shown commercially
in the United States are classified into one of four categories-X, R,
PG, or G.2" The "X" category is the industry's equivalent of "adult."
Indeed, when that symbol is attached to a film, no person under 17
years of age may be admitted to the exhibition.". Under the "R"
rating, the industry's equivalent of "almost adult," persons under 17
years of age must be accompanied by a parent or guardian.22 In many
19. 427 U.S. at 90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
20. See generally Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A Con-
stitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 185
(1973).




parts of the country, particularly in small towns, "X" and sometimes
even "R" films have long been considered untouchable by exhibitors.
23
Now that American Mini Theaters has given judicial sanction to the
regulation of "adult" as well as "obscene" films, it seems quite likely
that exhibitors who are subject to ordinances such as those in Detroit
will simply use "X" and "R" as their indicia of what is "adult," and
hence to be avoided. "X" and "R" rated films currently comprise ap-
proximately 55 percent of all motion pictures exhibited in this coun-
try.24 But as adult motion picture zoning ordinances begin to pro-
liferate, it is likely that the number of commercial outlets for "X" and
"R" films will dwindle drastically, assuming that many exhibitors will
equate these symbols with the term "adult." Because the limited
market for "X" and "R" rated films will probably render those films
economically unsuccessful, film producers will have a strong induce-
ment to produce a higher percentage of material which will be eligible
for "G" or "PG" ratings. Thus, while the original purpose of the De-
troit zoning ordinance was to prevent urban blight,25 the ultimate effect
of American Mini Theaters may be to "reduce the adult population of
[the United States] to [viewing] only what is fit for children. ' 0
Application for Waiver of Zoning Restrictions
If an exhibitor does not wish to engage in a blanket form of self-
censorship, but also does not desire to subject himself to criminal lia-
bility, he can, of course, apply for a waiver of the restrictions if the
zoning ordinance so provides. The Detroit ordinance authorizes the
Zoning Commission to waive the one thousand foot restriction if it
finds, inter alia, "that the spirit and intent of this Ordinance will be
observed" and "that the proposed use will not enlarge or encourage
the development of a 'skid row' area.' '2 7 As previously mentioned, re-
spondent theater operators in American Mini Theaters had challenged
23. Id. at 217 & n.210. See also Variety, Oct. 27, 1976, at 34, col. 1, reporting
that among Wisconsin exhibitors in towns with under 5,000, most "won't touch [the]
X product" and many are reluctant to exhibit "R" rated films.
24. See Variety, Nov. 3, 1976, at 3, col. 3.
25. See 427 U.S. at 54 n.6.
26. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). See also Interstate Circuit
v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
27. The entire waiver provision reads:
'The ordinance authorizes the Zoning Commission to waive the 1,000-foot restric-
tion if it finds:
"a) That the proposed use will not be contrary to the public interest or injurious
to nearby properties, and that the spirit and intent of this Ordinance will be observed.
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this provision on the ground of vagueness, arguing that it did not "spe-
cify adequate procedures or standards for obtaining a waiver of the
1,000-foot restriction."2  The Court did not respond to the merits of
that challenge but simply stated that the respondents lacked standing
to raise that argument since neither of them had "alleged any basis for
claiming or anticipating any waiver of the restriction as applied to its
theater."29
Whatever the merits of the theater owners' substantive "lack of
standards" attack, °3 it is clear that the Detroit waiver section is pro-
cedurally inadequate in at least two respects. The first of these is that
the provision fails to guarantee an applicant the right to a hearing be-
fore the Zoning Commission.3' The second, and even more critical,
defect is that the ordinance fails to provide for judicial review of the
Commission's denial of a waiver application. Regardless of the fact
that the ordinance euphemistically refers to itself as a zoning ordinance,
it functions as a prior restraint on the exhibition of constitutionally pro-
tected materials.32 If an "adult" license is denied, or a waiver of the
zoning restriction is refused, an exhibitor is foreclosed from showing
a movie even though that movie has never been judicially declared
either "obscene" or "adult" within the meaning of the ordinance. The
absence of a judicial determination violates the requirements of
Freedman v. Maryland, which held:
[A] noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a
film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place
under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is un-
protected expression must rest on the censor. . . . Second . . .
only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to im-
pose a valid final restraint. . . . To this end, the exhibitor must
be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the
censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license
or go to court to restrain showing the film. . . [Third], the pro-
"b) That the proposed use will not enlarge or encourage the development of a 'skid
row' area.
"c) That the establishment of an additional regulated use in the area will not be
be contrary to any program of neigh[bor]hood conservation nor will it interfere with any
program of urban renewal.
"d) That all applicable regulations of this Ordinance will be observed." 427 U.S.
54 n.7.
28. Id. at 58.
29. Id. at 59.
30. Compare Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), with Interstate Cir-
cuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
31. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
32. See American Mini Theatres v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975).
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cedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to mini-
mize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous
denial of a license.
33
Thus, unless and until Freedman is overruled, the exhibitor is entitled
to know that the censoring agency will, within a brief period of time,
either issue a license for the showing of a film or go to court to re-
strain its exhibition.
Judicial "Narrowing Construction" of the Term "Adult"
It seems inevitable that the judiciary will become involved in this
new genre of litigation over erotic movies. Judicial involvement will
occur not only because of the mandate of Freedman, but also because
there is likely to be a plethora of criminal proceedings instituted against
theater owners who have allegedly slipped into a "regulated use" with-
out first having obtained a special "adult" license or a waiver of restric-
tions.
Ultimately, then, the courts must construe the term "adult."
Their task will be two-fold. First, they must decide how often a
theater must be used for presenting "adult" films before that theater
becomes an "adult motion picture theater." The wording of the De-
troit ordinance seems to indicate that any time an "adult" film is shown,
the building in which it is exhibited becomes an "adult" theater.
Second, and regardless of the answer to the first question, the courts
must decide what quantity of specified sexual activities or specified ana-
tomical areas may be permissible before any given movie is "character-
ized by an emphasis" on sexually explicit matter.
The American judiciary, however, has always seemed disinclined
to engage in erotic quantification. 4 Hence, it is quite probable that
some courts will simply attempt to adopt judicially the film industry's
standard for "adult"--that is, the "X" and, perhaps, "R" ratings. It
is unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court will allow the state and
local judiciaries to adopt the industry's classifications because such a
system is totally devoid of standards and criteria for determining which
movies are "adult" and required to be rated "X" or "R." Thus, many
33. 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
34. In none of the post-Roth obscenity cases, for example, did the Court attempt
to define obscenity in terms of the quantity of the erotic material contained in a movie
or publication. On the other hand, a Canadian Court recently attempted to adjudicate
the issue of the obscenity of Last Tango in Paris by totaling the number of minutes in
which the film depicted sexual scenes. Regina v. Odeon Morton Theatres Ltd., 45
D.L.R.3d 224 (1974).
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state and lower federal courts have already held, in contexts other than
zoning, that the "X" and "R" designations are too vague and impres-
sionistic to serve as a substantive standard for the governmental regu-
lation of time, place, or manner of exhibitions of allegedly "adult"
films.
In Motion Picture Association v. Spector,3" for example, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in-
validated a state statute which prohibited the showing of previews for
"X" and "R" movies at exhibitions of "G" or "PG" films. In holding
the statute void for vagueness, the court noted:
The evidence clearly established that the Code and Rating Admin-
istration of the [Motion Picture] Association has itself no defined
standards or criteria against which to measure its ratings. Twelve
persons .. .do the rating, a voluntary Association undertaking.
Films viewed are simply graded according to the individual reac-
tions of the viewing members.
30
The court concluded that the statute was "so patently vague and lacking
in any ascertainable standards and so infringe[d] upon the plaintiffs'
rights to freedom of expression, as protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments . . . as to render it unconstitutional. 37
A similar conclusion has been reached by several other federal
and state courts which have considered the constitutional permissibility
of the use of the "X" and "R" classifications as a device for ferreting
out "adult" films which would be subjected to governmental restrictions
not imposed on other films.3 8 In each of these cases, the "X" and "R"
symbols were held to be impermissibly vague standards for regulation.
It is doubtful that this result will be changed merely because the new
"adult" restrictions will be imposed under the mandate of a zoning or-
dinance.
Legislative Clarification of the Term "Adult"
If a city council attempts to incorporate the film industry's "X" and
"R" designations as the official indicia of what is "adult," the same consti-
35. 315 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
36. Id. at 825.
37. Id. at 826.
38. See, e.g., Engdahl v. City of Kenosha, 317 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Wis. 1970)
(holding that an ordinance prohibiting persons under age 18, unaccompanied by a parent
or guardian, from viewing "X" and "R" rated movies was unconstitutional); Hooksett
Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. Hooksett, 110 N.H. 287, 266 A.2d 124 (1970) (invalidating
an ordinance imposing a $500 fee on each drive-in showing of an "X" rated picture).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
tutional infirmity-vagueness-will be present as would be found if a
court based its reasoning on the "X" and "R" symbols. Moreover, it
seems unlikely that any practicable definition of the term "adult" will
or can be formulated. As previously noted, the problem is not one
of defining specified sexual activities or anatomical areas, but rather
one of determining how much of those activities or areas in a film
render the film "adult." A legislatively declared percentage seems
unthinkable, but without such a clarification, renewed "vagueness"
challenges are inevitable. The merits of such a challenge, as indicated
by the court in American Mini Theaters, ultimately must be judically
resolved. All that is necessary to place the matter squarely before the
courts is that the plaintiff have standing to raise the vagueness argu-
ment-that is, that he not be a theater owner whose predominant busi-
ness is that of exhibiting sexually explicit films.
Conclusion
The true vice of a standardless "adult" motion picture zoning sys-
tem can perhaps best be understood by an examination of the Supreme
Court's opinion in a nonzoning case, Interstate Circuit v. Dallas."9 In
that decision, the Court invalidated a Dallas ordinance which author-
ized an administrative board to classify films as to their suitability for
-young persons and to bar young persons from movies found unsuitable.
In holding that the statutory definition of "not suitable for young per-
sons" was excessively vague, even though it was accompanied by a three
paragraph definition, the Court noted that the true problem with the
vagueness of the Dallas "adult" classification system was that it forced
filmmakers, who were uncertain as to the criteria for an "adult" classifi-
cation, to choose between producing totally innocuous films and run-
ning the risk of foreclosure from a vast portion of the market. Although
the Dallas classification system, like the Detroit zoning system, did not
impose penal sanctions on filmmakers, the Court found that it was their
constitutional rights-as well as those of the adult moviegoing public-
which were most deeply affected by the ordinance. Filmmakers,
unclear as to the standards for an "adult" rating, were likely to err on
the side of caution and blandness. The result there, as here, would
be to reduce the entire adult population to viewing only those films
deemed fit for children. As the Court in Interstate Circuit remarked:
The vice of vagueness is particularly pronounced where ex-
pression is sought to be subjected to licensing. It may be unlikely
39. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
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that what Dallas does in respect to the licensing of motion pictures
would have a significant effect upon film makers in Hollywood
or Europe. But what Dallas may constitutionally do, so may other
cities and States. Indeed, we are told that this ordinance is being
used as a model for legislation in other localities. Thus, one who
wishes to convey his ideas through that medium, which of course
includes one who is interested not so much in expression as in
making money, must consider whether what he proposes to film,
and how he proposes to film it, is within the terms of classification
schemes such as this. If he is unable to determine what the ordi-
nance means, he runs the risk of being foreclosed, in practical ef-
fect, from a significant portion of the movie-going public. Rather
than run the risk, he might choose nothing but the innocuous. ...
The vast wasteland that some have described in reference to
another medium might be a verdant paradise in comparison.
40
40. Id. at 683-84 (emphasis added).
